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ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: 
A PRIMER FOR THE WORLD BANK'S 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2001 
 
The interface between development and the environment is intertwined with the 
trade orientation of a country. Trade negotiations and agreements that have taken place in 
the last ten years have polarized the environmental concerns of interest groups and the 
general public. There is concern that a global phenomenal income growth has been 
accompanied by environmental degradation. The issue has been raised of whether 
globalization and the opening of trade have contributed to this environmental 
degradation. Beyond the rhetoric, true environmental problems have been identified, such 
as unsustainable fishing and water supply in some regions of the globe (Bailey 1995, 
Nordström and Vaughan 1999). 
There was and still is a public perception that pollution-intensive industries are 
moving wholesale to developing economies. Some of the concerns are legitimate, but 
setting common rules on so-called beyond-the-border measures, such as environmental 
standards and competition policy, will prove to be significantly more challenging, if not 
counterproductive, in a multilateral setting. Countries have different priorities, which are 
in large part a reflection of different levels of development. In particular, developing 
countries may perceive a sharper trade-off between development goals and sensible, 
though perhaps elusive, environmental goals. In many countries, poverty is a key 
contributor to environmental degradation. Poorer countries are likely to make different 
choices in facing trade-offs between growth and environmental goals than industrial 
countries will make. It is important that developing countries retain access to the 
international trading system, even if their domestic environmental policies are not those 
that are preferred by richer countries.  
Alternative mechanisms already exist and should be the preferred forum in which to 
discuss environmental goals. Several international institutions, such as the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and international environmental summits, have an 
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environmental mandate and should be the preferred forum to discuss and agree on 
environmental goals. Further, donor countries and international agencies can and do 
make their assistance conditional upon achieving environmental goals, including 
important aspects of the global commons. 
 
The Interface between Economic Growth, 
Environmental Protection, and Trade 
The interface between the environment and the development process is complex and 
conditioned by the trade orientation of a country. First, economic growth implies 
increased economic activity, which, in turn, implies increased pollution, other things 
being equal. Producing more implies more pollution or more environmental degradation; 
this is known as the scale effect (Copeland and Taylor 1994). This effect is empirically 
important, especially for countries that specialize in environment-intensive activities, 
such as mining, fisheries, and forestry in Chile and industrial chemicals and petroleum in 
Indonesia (Lee and Roland-Holst 1997). At the same time, the technological 
improvements that drive growth result in savings on inputs, including energy and 
environmental amenities. This effect decreases the pollution intensity of growth. Further, 
higher living standards increase the affordability and desirability of reduced pollution and 
indirectly lead to better environmental protection.  
Typically, economic growth is attained through productivity gains that result from 
adopting new or newer technology and knowledge. Technological improvements are 
driven by potential savings on inputs, (such as energy and environmental amenities), 
which become or are “scarce” in countries experiencing economic growth. This second 
force is an offsetting element, decreasing the pollution intensity of growth. Capital flows 
facilitate the transfer of technology and contribute to a cleaner environment.  
A third important influence on the environment comes from the division of labor or 
specialization undertaken by a developing economy. Relative endowments of factors 
change with economic development. Their relative prices change as well, creating 
opportunities to become competitive in some new industries, but also challenging 
established industries to remain competitive or else shrink. Trade liberalization induces a 
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new specialization in production and consumption, which may or may not exacerbate the 
environmental degradation occurring in the economy. The latter factor is known as the 
composition effect. Development also induces a composition effect as rising incomes 
lead to a more than proportionate rise in consumption of (relatively cleaner) services.  
Policy distortions, such as consumption, production, or border taxes, can have a 
major influence on the relative prices and profitability of sectors in the economy. Policies 
determine the competitiveness of sectors and their associated use of environmental 
resources. Some distortions have stronger environmental consequences than others. For 
example, subsidized energy usually implies a more energy-intensive economy and, 
therefore, more pollution emissions. Hence, the World Bank’s long-term message of 
getting prices right remains important to insure that distorted price signals do not 
subsidize environmental degradation. The dramatic decrease in the energy intensity of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) and 
China, following their transition to market economies, illustrates such a policy principle 
(Vukina et al. 1999, World Bank 1997). For example, energy intensity in China 
decreased by 30 percent between 1985 and 1997. 
All these forces interact simultaneously, and their net effect has to be assessed 
empirically. The available evidence on the environmental impact of trade policy reform 
and integration in goods and factors markets does not support the pessimistic conjecture 
of a wholesale specialization in dirty activities by developing economies. There is 
convincing evidence that under an import substitution strategy, countries have specialized 
in pollution-intensive manufacturing activities for which they are not truly competitive. 
Outward orientation has reduced the pollution intensity of output in several countries 
through a composition effect (Birdsall and Wheeler 1992). There is also evidence of 
lower energy intensity brought about by a strong increase in the domestic price of oil 
following trade liberalization (Vukina et al. 1999). 
Similar findings emerge for natural resource use. For example, a recent study has 
assessed the impact of trade liberalization on agriculture and soil erosion in Sri Lanka 
(Bandara and Coxhead 1999). This study finds that openness increases the demand for 
land in tea production, which is a relatively less erosive sector than other crops, and thus 
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has environmental as well as economic benefits for the Sri Lankan economy. In the long 
run, an increased demand for land has a positive impact on the emergence of land 
markets and reduces the uncertainty on the returns to land conservation investment. 
However, some countries do show patterns of specialization into dirty activities 
following trade liberalization: e.g., Indonesia (Lee and Roland-Holst 1997, Strutt and 
Anderson 1999), China (Dean 1999, Jha et al. 1999, Dessus et al. forthcoming), Costa 
Rica (Dessus and Bussolo 1998, Abler et al. 1999), and Turkey (Jha et al. 1999). These 
countries are expanding or specializing in activities that are harmful to the environment. 
Both scale and, possibly, specialization induce environmental degradation. There is 
no definite evidence on which effect is dominant. Evidence reviewed by Beghin and 
Potier (1997) suggests that the scale effect is the most important. Countries face more 
domestic pollution following trade liberalization because their aggregate activities have 
expanded, but not necessarily because they are specializing in dirty activities. However, 
new numerical evidence from a study by (Ferrantino and Linkins 1999) suggests that 
specialization is a more important determinant of pollution than scale. These authors 
provide estimates of the output effects of trade liberalization (the Uruguay Round and a 
hypothetical liberalization scenario in manufacturing) on toxic emissions using a 
multicountry, applied general equilibrium model. Liberalization slightly reduces global 
pollution by rationalizing formerly protected sectors, which are pollution-intensive. Parts 
of Asia, as well as the economies in transition may become more polluted as a result of 
liberalization. In short, the jury is still out on the respective contribution of specialization 
and scale to pollution. Table 1 summarizes this evidence. 
The specialization in dirty activities is not by itself evidence of externalities, but 
there is evidence that the burgeoning, often informal, environmental protection in many 
countries does not internalize the cost of pollution appropriately (Pargal and Wheeler 
1996, Hartman et al. 1997). 
Furthermore, resource allocation tends to be more efficient under free trade, because 
world prices are often closer to social prices than the former distorted domestic prices. 
The energy content of aggregate manufacturing output tends to decrease with trade 
liberalization. Capital-intensive dirty production relocates from developing to developed 
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economies, where it is more resource-efficient and less polluting (Ferrantino and Linkins 
1999). Vukina et al. (1999) find a result consistent with that of Ferrantino and Linkins in 
looking at the impact of market and institutional reforms on pollution emissions and 
energy use in 12 former centrally planned economies. The energy use per unit of 
aggregate product declines drastically with market reform, although the decline in energy 
use may have been caused by the cleaner composition of manufacturing output following 
trade and price liberalization. 
The findings just discussed are consistent with the earlier findings of Lucas et al. 
(1992). Outward-oriented economies have lower pollution-intensity of aggregate output 
relative to inward-oriented ones and have been exhibiting declining pollution intensities 
with outward-oriented growth in the 1980s. However, the robustness of the systematic 
link between openness and declining pollution intensities of output has been questioned 
by Rock (1996). Measuring openness and market integration at the margin remains 
challenging in the context of large panel data of countries and industries. 
 
Policy Responses to the Interface between Growth, 
the Environment, and Trade 
Trade Sanctions for Environmental Protection 
Several robust messages arise from economic theory on the use of trade barriers for 
environmental protection. In general, both consumption and production activities do 
pollute, and tariffs are usually ineffectual instruments to tackle pollution and 
environmental degradation. Only when the externality originates in trade are trade taxes a 
good instrument to address the problem (Subramanian 1992). There is a ranking of 
instruments to address pollution emissions that follows the targeting principle (Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan 1997), which in effect says, “the closer the better.” Hence, emission taxes 
are the best instrument to address pollution emission and minimize distortionary effects 
elsewhere in the economy. If emission taxes are not feasible, input taxes are preferable to 
production taxes, which are themselves preferable to tariffs (Beghin et al. 1997, Lloyd 
1992, Ulph 1999, and others).  
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This point has been documented empirically in the case of forestry products (Barbier 
and Rauscher 1994) and also for the Indonesian economy (Lee and Roland-Holst 1997). 
Indonesia tends to specialize in resource- and pollution-intensive activities with 
increasing economic integration. However, pollution emissions at the national level (as 
opposed to a sector level) cannot be decreased even modestly using tariffs. By contrast, 
they show that production taxes proportional to the pollution content of output make the 
abatement feasible at a reasonable cost in terms of foregone growth. 
 
Joint Trade and Environmental Policy Responses 
Economic theory also has a set of robust recommendations on piecemeal reforms 
when both environmental and trade policies are considered. First, trade liberalization 
undertaken when “optimal” environmental protection is in place increases welfare 
(Anderson 1992, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1997). The environmental protection in place 
internalizes the cost of pollution, which may or may not increase with trade liberalization. 
Second, when the economy is ridden with both trade and environmental distortions, trade 
liberalization accompanied by an increase in environmental taxes increases welfare by 
internalizing the cost of pollution (Copeland 1994, Beghin et al. 1997). The intuition is 
the standard second-best principle—that reducing one of the two distortions at the time 
may exacerbate the other distortion and result in welfare losses. Joint reform of 
environmental and trade policy appears even more crucial when capital is mobile across 
borders and can exacerbate a country’s specialization in dirty activities (Copeland 1994). 
Hence, there is a strong economic foundation for a country to tackle both distortions 
(trade and environmental) simultaneously and with two instruments. More generally, the 
joint reform principle motivates countries to address economic integration and 
environmental protection jointly rather than sequentially in the context of a growth 
strategy. This principle also legitimizes environmental side-agreements within trade 
agreements to avoid the exacerbation of environmental distortions. These side 
agreements, such as in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
can be based on reciprocal recognition of each country’s environmental regulations and 
do not imply harmonization of environmental standards across countries. They also 
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achieve a pragmatic objective of putting to rest concerns of environmental regulatory 
chill. 
 
Feasible Environmental Protection in Developing Economies 
Given that free trade and environmental protection should be undertaken jointly, 
which environmental policies are feasible and desirable in a developing economy? 
Environmental protection as part of the economic development process can be 
characterized by a continuum of institutional quality that guides and sustains economic 
activity. There is a supply and demand side to the quality of institutions protecting the 
environment, and both are influenced by the trade orientation of an economy. 
On the demand side, economic growth implies higher income and increasing demand 
for environmental protection and standards. This process is a political one because, in 
most instances, environmental protection cannot be purchased readily on the market by 
decentralized agents. This demand for environmental protection is multifaceted like the 
environment. Economic agents care first about their immediate environment (water, air) 
or about environmental factors that directly affect their health. At much higher levels of 
income, environmental problems that are more remote in space and time eventually 
become prominent; this typically occurs after graduation from the developing economy 
stage. The “global village” is an industrialized-country notion. Free trade reinforces the 
demand for effective environmental institutions by fostering the income prospects of 
economic agents through a greater pie and unfettered knowledge flows. 
On the supply side, governments in developing economies have scarce amounts of 
resources and human capital to allocate to the provision of competing institutional 
functions, including environmental protection. These governments are accumulating 
policy and institutional experience, and some stylized facts are emerging. Institutional 
knowledge can be transferred across industries and borders. Hence, the free movement of 
institutional knowledge reinforces the sustainability of economic development. This is a 
robust conclusion. Environmental side-agreements to trade agreements could facilitate 
such knowledge transfer. 
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Cleaner technology innovation and adoption in industrial countries have been driven 
by environmental regulation. Transnational firms tend to standardize and replicate the 
technologies appropriate in the regulated North market, in all markets. Combined with 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the use of technology-laden imported inputs, this 
cleaner technology has been transferred to developing economies. There are at least two 
well-documented cases of this happening on a global scale: for the paper and pulp 
industry (Wheeler and Martin 1992), and for the steel industry (Reppelin-Hill 1999). 
Hence, in the short run, environmental protection “spills over” from the North to the 
South and mitigates environmental degradation in the South, but falls short of providing 
full-fledged environmental protection there. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that all firms will adopt the new and cleaner technology. 
Indeed, there is a wide range of capital vintage in many industries (e.g., Pargal and 
Wheeler 1996). Capital stock is dated in mature industries and is more likely to pollute. 
Lessons can be learned from the experience of industrial countries when thinking about 
feasible environmental policy in the context of developing economies (O'Connor 1994). 
It is clear now that environmental protection is relatively inexpensive in terms of 
foregone growth or of the capital cost of abatement for private firms. This is more 
obviously true in fast-growing industries. Despite the inefficiency of the command and 
control approach that most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries have used to address pollution, the cost of compliance to industries has 
been surprisingly small and abatement has been significant (Jaffe et al. 1995). Hence, the 
debate on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments may be less important than 
it first appears. Several approaches can be used by countries with developing economies 
as long as the approaches lead to predictable outcomes for private agents affected by the 
new policy. The following paragraphs discuss such approaches implemented by 
developing economies. 
What has been the developing countries' experience with various policies and 
institutions? Market-based instruments have proven effective in tackling environmental 
problems. A reduction of subsidies on pollution-intensive activities or raising taxes on 
polluting activities (via discharge, input, or output taxes) decreases pollution and 
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increases tax revenues. There are instances of such policy changes in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Brazil, and other countries (World Bank 1997). Market-based instruments also 
provide incentives for countries to save on the taxed resource and become more resource-
efficient. The more targeted the instrument, the better. Some countries, such as China and 
Malaysia, use emissions charges with some success. When the cost of monitoring is not 
prohibitive, the market instrument can be very targeted. For example, stumpage fees are 
used successfully in many countries to foster sustainable forest management (World 
Bank 1997). New evidence from China gathered by Wang and Wheeler (2000) shows 
that China has been successfully abating pollution for the past 20 years using levies, and 
that firms do respond rapidly to levies by abating emissions. 
Markets can mitigate environmental issues induced by open access and lack of 
property rights. Markets can be created when they do not exist. The most obvious 
examples are land and water markets. Better property rights induce pricing of resources 
that is closer to their social value and that stimulates conservation. Allocation of property 
rights can be done readily, and the institutional support to define and enforce these rights 
can be built incrementally (O’Connor 1994). For land markets, for example, titling and 
simple zoning are important first steps toward better property rights and environmental 
protection. 
Privatization and competition—or incremental reform in this direction—are other 
effective ways to promote better resource management. Several studies identify state 
firms as worse polluters than the private sector (Pargal and Wheeler 1996) or state 
planning as worse than market economies (Vukina et al. 1999). Incentives to economize, 
combined with increased resources for better management, have improved the 
performance of public entities in many countries. For example, water user associations 
have been substituting successfully for the government in the provision of irrigation 
water in several countries. 
Policymakers and private agents in developing economies focus their attention on 
domestic environmental problems rather than on global ones. Addressing these domestic 
problems provides the most direct benefits for developing economies. Phasing out leaded 
gasoline, creating clean water provisions, and decreasing air pollution are achievable 
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targets that will lead to improvements in health and, indirectly, in human capital. Health 
benefits from major air pollution abatement are generated by environmental policy. 
Hence, these environmental policies can pay for themselves, or at least reduce the social 
cost of pollution abatement, through reduced health expenditure due to reduced morbidity 
and mortality (Dasgupta et al. 1997, Beghin et al. 1999).  
As institutional capacity progresses, more ambitious policies are feasible with 
political will. Chile and Malaysia offer examples of ambitious pollution control programs 
that have been successful in abating air and water pollution. Vukina et al. (1999) in a 
study of 12 former centrally planned countries, found that stronger environmental 
regulatory regimes reinforced the shift towards less-polluting allocation of resources 
induced by market and trade reforms. Pollution abatement through environmental 
protection appears clearly feasible in former centrally planned countries and is strongly 
related to income levels attained by these countries. The development of environmental 
protection is a generic problem of institution building in a developing economy under 
severe scarcity of key inputs (human capital, financial resources, etc.). Inconsistent 
regulations, lack of enforcement, and weak monitoring are other generic problems faced 
by many countries (Jha et al. 1999), and not only in the area of environmental protection.  
Engaging the public is an essential ingredient in successful environmental protection, 
thus the political dimension of institution building. This process can be positive by 
fostering partnerships among the public, firms, and authorities. The government can be a 
facilitator for private industry by promoting the dissemination of information on new 
technology and environmental regulations. The process also can be coercive in the sense 
of fostering disclosure of violation of environmental regulations (e.g., illegal discharges). 
This principle has been effective in developing economies, such as China (Dasgupta and 
Wheeler 1997), although complaints tend to be positively associated with higher income 
and human capital. 
 
Race to the Bottom 
Market integration and trade liberalization between countries with different levels of 
environmental regulation raises concerns of compromising the ability to protect the 
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environment. The issue is the environmental “race to the bottom.” This phenomenon is 
seen when free movement of capital and goods between countries with different 
environmental regulations induces developing economies to attract and specialize in dirty 
industries and become pollution havens. A corollary conjecture is that integration inhibits 
the objectives of environmental regulatory reforms causing a regulatory chill—because of 
competitiveness concerns. 
The emergence of a race to the bottom is theoretically possible (Wilson 1997, 
Klevorick 1997), particularly in political and regulatory environments that are not 
transparent and that are vulnerable to capture by dirty-industry interests. (However, 
capture by “green” interests also is possible, where environmental protection may exceed 
public preferences.) Constraints on tax instruments, capital mobility, the lack of 
transparency and disclosure in the regulatory process, and the lack of mobility and 
representation of the population in the political process all foster the emergence of a race 
to the bottom. A race to the top is more likely to emerge with capital mobility and a 
“green” capture of the political process. At the moment, there is little evidence that either 
a race to the bottom or to the top has emerged, with the exception of the not-in-my-back 
yard (NIMBY) attitude prevalent in the United States in the management of interstate 
hazardous waste shipments (Levinson 1997b). Table 2 summarizes the investigations 
supporting this lack of evidence, which is also discussed later.  
Several recent studies have used the cross-sectional Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, 
which explains specialization based on environmental abundance, to indirectly examine 
the effects of environmental regulation on international competitiveness (Han 1996, Kalt 
1988, Valluru and Peterson 1997, Tobey 1990, Diakosauvas 1994, Xu 1999). This model 
examines the relationship that exists between the trade of a good and the factor intensities 
used to produce it, expressed as the amount of each production factor used in a unit of 
production of that good. Kalt (1988) examines the impact of domestic U.S. 
environmental regulatory costs on both inter-industry and aggregate trade performance 
using 1977 data. Using pollution abatement as a proxy for absorptive capacity, Kalt finds 
that his measure of regulation had a significantly negative effect on net exports of U.S. 
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manufacturing goods; i.e., tougher regulation led to a decline in international 
competitiveness.  
Tobey (1990) examines the impact of environmental regulation on world trade 
patterns in “dirty” commodities based on 1975 data. His study incorporates 11 factor 
inputs in the model as well as a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)-based qualitative variable that measures environmental stringency. The 
results provide no evidence that increased regulation has affected output in these 
pollution-intensive industries. Han (1996) uses panel data (industries and over time) to 
empirically test the environmental H-O model and actual expenditure data on pollution 
abatement as a measure of the environmental input. His study finds that increases in 
environmental regulation have a significantly negative effect on competitiveness, but this 
effect has been decreasing over time. The effects of increased domestic regulation were 
significant in the past, but with regulation tightening in foreign countries, these effects 
have become much less significant. In addition, abatement costs also have been dropping, 
with new capital vintages, learning by doing, and new technologies.  
Valluru and Peterson (1997) and Diakosauvas (1994) assess the impact of 
environmental regulation on agricultural trade. The evidence suggests little support for a 
significant negative regulatory effect, except for the most polluting crops, such as cotton 
and tobacco. Finally, Xu (1999) examines the impact of stringent environmental 
standards on the international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries, 
using a similar approach. He finds that the export performance of these goods for most of 
the 34 countries included in his data set was unchanged between the 1960s and the 1990s, 
despite the emergence of environmental standards in most developed countries since 
1970. 
The evidence on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and potential pollution havens is 
consistent with the small amount of evidence coming from the empirical H-O model. For 
example, the evidence suggests that the United States is importing pollution-intensive 
industries more than it is exporting them and that dirty industries are no more likely to 
invest abroad than other industries (Albrecht cited in Nordström and Vaughan 1999, 
Eskeland and Harrison 1997). Eskeland and Harrison look at French and U.S. FDI flows 
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going into manufacturing industries in the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. They find no evidence of pollution-intensive bias in the allocation of the FDI 
among industries. Nevertheless, Xing and Kolstad (1995) find that U.S. FDI in chemical 
industries seems influenced by weak environmental regulations proxied by SO2 
emissions. The same authors find that the FDI of other, cleaner industries were not 
influenced by environmental stringency. 
The plant location approach to assess the impact of environmental regulation on 
competitiveness and production location is a richer approach than the trade flow 
approach, and it is probably the closest to a true empirical test of the race to the bottom. 
There is limited evidence supporting the industrial flight conjecture, however. Firm 
surveys investigating relocation decisions provide some information. An UNCTAD 
survey on relocation of transnational corporations (UNCTAD 1993) appears to give 
credence to the race to the bottom argument. Runge (1994) also refers to a firm survey in 
the context of NAFTA. Surveys tend to be less reliable than actual data because they 
report what is said rather than what is done (Levinson 1997a).  
Levinson uses establishment-level manufacturing data and the Survey of Pollution 
Abatement Costs and Expenditures to examine the effect of differences in the stringency 
of state environmental regulations on establishment location choice. Levinson 
investigates the link between site choice and environmental regulations for many 
industries and measures of stringency, using limited dependent variables, as in previous 
studies by Bartik (1989) and others. Interstate differences in environmental regulations do 
not systematically affect the location choices of most manufacturing plants in the United 
States. 
Using a similar approach, Mani et al. (1997) look at the same location issue for 
manufacturing firms in India. India has environmental controls at both the federal and 
state levels. Although regulations are set at the federal level, the states implement and 
enforce these regulations. Differences between states' attitudes towards environmental 
policy may influence firm location. The authors use industry-level data to examine the 
location decisions of new manufacturing plants for a wide range of manufacturing 
industries and also for the smaller subset of pollution-intensive industries. They find an 
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unexpected positive correlation between manufacturing location and their second proxy 
for stringency, which is the state budget share spent on environmental programs. It is 
possible that the latter variable measures state efficiency, which induces firms to locate in 
states with higher environmental expenditure—in short, the antithesis of the race to the 
bottom, or in other words, a race to the top as a proxy for efficient public good provision. 
Several other studies have looked at the impact of environmental regulation in 
agriculture, but mostly in OECD countries. Metcalfe (2000) provides a thorough 
investigation of the hog industry in the United States and selected foreign countries. He 
finds little evidence of stringency having an impact on location of hog production in the 
United States in a panel data of hog production across states, farm size, and over time. 
The only notable impact is the negative impact of regulatory stringency on small 
operators. There is no impact on large, modern confinement livestock producers. Data 
constraints exclude such systematic analysis at the international level. This result is 
consistent with a recent report by Hettige et al. (1996) who find evidence of economies of 
scale in environmental compliance for many other industries in several countries. These 
two studies suggest that in a developing economy with a larger range of firm size and 
technology vintage, environmental protection may affect smaller and older firms and 
precipitate their decline, but that this effect would probably be modest in aggregate given 
the small share of environmental compliance cost in the total cost of production. 
A last insight on competitiveness, specialization, and environmental regulation 
comes from the positive link found between environmental performance and profitability 
of firms in the United States (Repetto 1995, Cohen and Fenn 1997). Although 
environmental compliance is not free, it creates new market opportunities and may 
induce further efficiency gains that may partly offset the small cost of compliance. 
Environmental performance appears to be systematically associated with higher 
profitability.  
In sum, looking at the four approaches (trade patterns for goods, FDI patterns, plant 
location studies, and environmental performance), there is little evidence in support of 
pessimistic conjectures regarding environmental regulation and competitiveness. 
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The Cost of Environmental Protection in Developing Economies 
There is a convergence in the evidence coming from various but complementary 
approaches used to look at the cost of environmental regulation in developing economies. 
This important stylized fact helps explain the non-emergence of pollution havens. 
Detailed qualitative case studies of individual industries undertaken by UNCTAD (Jha et 
al. 1999) corroborate the stylized findings obtained with numerical applied general 
equilibrium (AGE) models (Beghin et al. forthcoming). In the latter study, the cost of 
abatement appears modest for most types of emissions when it is expressed in terms of 
the foregone GDP growth induced by pollution abatement. Further health benefits appear 
substantial for air pollution abatement in the case of Chile. This finding of feasible 
pollution abatement was a recurrent stylized fact for Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Costa 
Rica, China, Vietnam, and Morocco, using two AGE models differing in their 
assumptions on abatement possibilities and for 13 pollution types. Bio-accumulative 
toxic release in water is the only pollution type that is expensive to abate. 
The cost of environmental protection is moderate and does not compromise 
competitiveness. Findings pertaining to the developing world are consistent with the 
extensive literature investigating the impact of environmental regulation on 
competitiveness in the United States (Jaffe et al. 1995, Levinson 1997a). For example, 
Malaysia is an interesting case of specialization in environment-intensive activities 
accompanied by environmental protection (Jha et al. 1999). In Malaysia, two rather 
rapidly expanding major export industries, the palm oil complex and electronics, have 
been facing substantial environmental regulations that were implemented rapidly. The 
palm oil industry faced a loss of profit but has adapted well to the new regulations and 
taxes. Compliance is high and exports have not decreased, despite the limited 
opportunities to pass on to consumers the cost increase of crude and refined palm oil in 
world markets. These markets are very competitive, and many substitutes exist for these 
goods. State-funded research has helped to develop commercial by-products from the 
palm meal, which reduced the cost of compliance by generating revenues from the 
by-products instead of treating or dumping them and paying penalties. The bulk of the 
program’s cost was passed on to palm growers, who lost suffered permanent losses 
20  /  Beghin 
   
through lower prices for fresh palm fruits (Jha et al. 1999, Khalid and Braden 1993). A 
similar successful adjustment occurred for the Malaysian electronics industry, which is 
highly compliant and competitive. Because of a strong FDI presence in Malaysia, the 
electronic industry has leap frogged to modern technology (Jha et al. 1999). 
 
Regional and Transboundary Policy Approaches 
Regional, rather than global, approaches to environmental standards also may prove 
to be a positive and more feasible step, particularly on issues with a clear regional 
component—such as transboundary emissions and shared water resources—and for 
countries with similar development levels or with strong prospects of rapid income 
convergence. To date, global environmental concerns have been dealt with outside the 
context of the trading system, with some success. In some cases, trade sanctions have 
been built in as an enforcement mechanism. But, the compatibility of these sanctions with 
the World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO/GATT) 
has yet to be tested and their effectiveness has yet to be scrutinized. Trade sanctions are 
typically untargeted and may induce large deadweight losses to consumers. 
A regional approach does not imply uniform standards, either in the broad sense of 
environmental protection (e.g., Bhagwati and Hudec 1997) or in the narrow sense of 
standards referring to pollution per unit of output in value or physical unit. The case 
against harmonization of policies is overwhelming in most settings. The major reason for 
such a strong presumption resides in different levels of marginal damage of pollution 
across countries or, in other words, in different levels of the valuation of the marginal 
benefits of environmental protection. 
When departing from the competitive market paradigm, the case against 
harmonization remains strong, although coordination of policies between two countries 
may make sense. Coordination between countries is a better choice than the subsidiary 
principle—each country deciding autonomously its policy level—when “eco-dumping” 
could arise if governments are constrained in their choice of policy instruments and face 
incentives to lower environmental policies below their optimum levels. 
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Finally, some product standards constitute non-excludable attributes by providing a 
definition of goods and their quality. They reduce information asymmetries, like labels 
do, and reduce transaction costs. They are endogenous and change with income and trade 
policy, if the latter affects income (Casella 1997). Harmonization or a move toward 
harmonization may arise only if income levels between trading partners converge. These 
standards may become common to several countries if coalitions supporting these 
standards cross borders. Hence, one could conceive of “harmonized” standards generated 
by political economy with a coalition of firms spanning several countries within one 
industry. 
 
Evidence of Trade Disputes Induced by Environmental Standards and Labels 
Have questionable technical barriers been used for environmental protection and led 
to trade disputes or impediments? Whalley and Hamilton (1996) report a limited number 
of instances for the 1982–1996 period. An examination of the WTO’s “Overview of the 
State-of-Play of WTO Disputes” reveals less than a handful of disputes based on 
technical barriers linked to environmental objectives since 1995. Only 2 out of the 43 
requests from developing countries involve an environmental objective (the case of 
reformulated U.S. gasoline and the U.S. ban on seafood products). Hence, although it is a 
concern, the frequency of actual trade disputes based on environmental protection is 
minimal. 
Roberts (1998) reports on U.S. agricultural exports that have actually been faced 
with questionable technical barriers in global export markets. The study shows that out of 
300 occurrences of such trade impediments, valued at close to $5 billion, only one was 
motivated for environmental reasons. Most of the measures involved food safety and 
protection of crops and livestock from pest and disease. Hence, phytosanitary and 
sanitary measures seem much more prevalent than purely environmental ones. The 
United States trades with many industrialized countries, and it is fair to assume that 
Roberts's study reflects general market conditions beyond the narrow U.S. focus of her 
investigation. 
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Eco-labeling schemes provide information to consumers on environmental standards 
met by final consumption goods. Eco-labels are another potential source of trade friction. 
These labels increase the cost of production by imposing fees and standards. Eco-labeling 
schemes, such as in textiles, require multiple production standards for dyes, fibers, and 
bleaching chemicals (OECD 1997). These standards increase the cost of production, but 
cost data are scarce. The eco-labeled market remains a niche market in many OECD 
countries. Fees are imposed in most schemes. For example, Canada's Environmental 
Choice Program imposes a 0.5 percent charge based on the price of the good on sales up 
to Canadian $1,000,000. Fixed costs arise from the application and site inspection 
involved in the certification process.  
Certification is another potential source of trade friction (Jha et al. 1999, Jha and 
Zarrilli 1994, OECD 1997, Zarsky 1994). Developing countries have voiced their 
concern that certification with industrialized labeling schemes may be virtually 
impossible for them. For example, based on the European Union (EU) Commission’s list 
of companies that have obtained the EU eco-label, there is a pattern consistent with this 
concern. Forty-eight licenses have been granted covering 219 products. None were 
granted to a developing economy firm, but it is not even clear that any applied. A 
surprising fact is the small number of licenses granted, which is consistent with a niche 
market situation and a lack of interest with the EU eco-label program (Nimon and Beghin 
1999). 
Eco-label schemes can be discriminatory, especially in markets such as textiles that 
are dominated by developing economies’ producers. Eco-label schemes could be 
construed as targeting the foreign production of these goods. Domestic industries have 
more say in the definition of these standards than foreign competitors (OECD 1997, Jha 
and Zarrilli 1994). Abstracting from political economy considerations, the standards are 
likely to address technologies that are feasible in industrialized countries but perhaps 
attach less weight to the input mix and technology set of developing countries. Further, 
the difference in their respective marginal utility of income implies different tolerance 
levels for pollution. Local eco-labels are emerging in developing countries, especially in 
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timber-based products but also in textiles, to promote better practice and preempt 
discriminatory labeling in industrialized countries.  
Malaysia supports eco-labels and standards that are seen as a marketing tool and 
insists on the following principles: labeling must be applied to all types of timber and 
should be based on internationally agreed-upon standards, not merely on standards 
developed by one or a few countries (Jha et al. 1999). This is consistent with the stylized 
findings of Nimon and Beghin (1999). One unresolved issue in Malaysia's eco-labeling is 
the cost of certification involved with labeling and international standards. Malaysia has 
an experimental program, associated with the ISO-14000 series and environmental 
management system, that assesses their costs and benefits to the private firms. The cost 
and feasibility of certification remains a major hurdle in many developing economies. 
 
Conclusions 
Economic theory provides strong support for joint trade and environmental policy 
design and implementation within one country. A joint reduction of both trade and 
environmental distortions is welfare improving for any country. Free trade, carried out 
jointly with reduced environmental degradation, is the relevant approach to sustain 
economic development. 
Attempts to coordinate these policies among countries in a context of multilateral 
agreements call for free trade among the countries, but not for harmonized environmental 
protection. The case against harmonization of environmental protection is overwhelming. 
Public policy measures other than trade sanctions will prove more effective in improving 
environmental standards.  
Common standards for environmental protection make sense in the limited context of 
the definition of quality of goods that consumers care about. Economies of scale may 
arise in having a common standard to define goods across boundaries, and consumers 
may exhibit a higher willingness to pay for greener goods, such as for eco-labeled goods. 
Developing economies may find it beneficial to have their own green label programs if 
industrialized countries use their own label as a protectionist device. 
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Nevertheless, actual cases of trade disputes based on environmental policy are rare, 
relative to other cases brought by developing economies. Concerns of developing 
economies related to such disputes may be exaggerated. Even in the case of eco-labels, 
the markets involved are limited relative to their conventional counterparts (e.g., textiles). 
A caveat may be that the cost of litigation is higher than the benefits brought by the 
dispute settlement mechanism, which is reflected in the small number of disputes. 
Policy and institutional arrangements to address pollution are in an experimental 
stage in developing economies. However, stylized facts have already emerged. 
Consumers care about and value environmental protection, even at low income levels. 
Further, simple measures can be highly effective in reducing pollution and increasing 
welfare. Such measures include the reduction of subsidies on polluting activities, public 
disclosure of violations and discharge levels, plant inspection and adoption of 
environmental management plans of the ISO-14000 type, titling and zoning, and user 
fees. As countries increase their institutional capacity, they can take on more ambitious 
programs. 
The cost of abatement is expected to be moderate for firms, based on the long-term 
OECD country experience and on the emerging experience of developing economies. In 
fact, the cost could be lower for developing countries because they can benefit from the 
experience of industrial countries. The cost of building public institutions for 
environmental protection is little known. It would be interesting to assess countries’ 
public expenditure on various public efforts for environmental protection in order to get a 
better understanding of the full cost of environmental protection. 
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Table 1. Scale, composition, and technique effects of trade liberalization on pollution 
  
Economywide Studies  
 
Counties 
 
Shock 
 
Scale 
 
Composition 
 
Technique 
Total 
Pollution 
Mexico1 Trade liberalization + - na small decrease 
USA1   with NAFTA + + na increase 
Canada1  + + na increase 
Mexico1 Trade liberalization + + na increase 
USA1   with NAFTA + + + na increase 
Canada1   investment  
  liberalization 
+ + na increase 
Mexico2 Trade liberalization +2.8 to  -4.3 to -.7 to -.2 to 6.4% 
   better terms of trade 3.7% 2.6% 3.5%  
   with U.S. and Canada     
Costa Rica3 Trade liberalization 9.4% 5.6 to 10.6%  + but small 15 to 20% 
Vietnam4 Trade liberalization 5 to 
8.8% 
-6.3 to 8% 1.1 to 7.5% 0.8 to 23.1% 
Indonesia5 Trade liberalization 
  with Japan 
0.8% -.36 to 2.86% na 0.51 to 3.73% 
Japan6 Trade liberalization 
  with Indonesia 
0.0% -.09 to -.02% na -.09 to -.02% 
OECD10 Multilateral  
  liberalization 
na na -0.02 to 
-0.0% 
-4.32 to -0% 
  
Panel Data  
Composition effect (pollution intensity of GDP or aggregated manufacturing output) and outward 
orientation 
Rock7  na + to 
ambiguous 
na na 
Lucas et al.8  na negative na na 
Vukina et al.9  na negative, 
robust 
na na 
1. Grossman and Krueger. Percentages not available.  
2. Beghin, Roland-Holst and van der Mensbrugghe (1995). The scale effect range refers to production and 
absorption. The ranges for composition and technique effects refer to 13 measures of pollution emissions. 
3. Dessus and Bussolo. The scale effect is the increase in output. Composition is the difference between total 
and scale effects. 
4. Dessus, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe. 
5. Lee and Roland-Holst. The range of composition effects refers to 10 pollutant types. They also report a 
human toxicity index.  
6. Lee and Roland-Holst. The range of composition effects refers to 10 pollutant types. They also report a 
human toxicity index. 
7. Rock uses four measures of outward orientation (Dollar index, dummy variable (closed/open) and rate of 
growth of exports and export shares). 
8. Lucas et al. use the Dollar index to measure outward orientation. 
9. Vukina et al. use EBRD scores of trade policy reform in CEE countries. 
10. Ferrantino and Linkins, Tables 7 and 9. Scale and composition figures are not disaggregated. 
1 to 9 are reproduced from Beghin and Potier. 
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Table 2. Evidence on international competitiveness and environmental regulation 
approach 
Approach Study Conclusion 
Cross-sectional Heckscher- 
  Ohlin (HO) model 
Kalt U.S. manufacturing exports negatively  
  impacted by environmental regulation 
 Tobey World trade in dirty commodities not  
  affected by environmental regulation 
 Han Small negative impact of regulation but  
  decreasing over time 
 Valluru and  
  Peterson 
Grain trade not impacted by environmental  
  regulation 
 Diakosauvas Exports of the five most polluting crops  
  negatively impacted by regulation 
 Xu Environmentally-sensitive exports of 34  
  countries not influenced by regulation 
   
FDI flows investigations Albrecht United States imports pollution-intensive  
  industries more than it exports them 
 Eskeland and  
  Harrison 
No pollution-intensive bias in French and 
  U.S. FDI in developing economies 
 Xing and Kolstad U.S. FDI influenced by weak regulation 
  only in chemical industries 
   
Plant location-firm surveys UNCTAD Environmental policy negatively 
   influences location 
 Levinson (1997a) 
summary 
Marginal impact of compliance cost except 
  for self-declared U.S. dirty industries 
   
Plant location-econometric 
  approach 
Levinson (1997a) No effect 
 Bartik Small and negative effect 
 Mani et al. Positive effect of one measure of environ- 
  mental stringency on plant location 
 Metcalfe Negative impact of regulatory stringency 
   on small U.S. livestock operators 
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